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Abstract
Why did Speaker of the House John Boehner face the largest intraparty challenge to an incumbent
speaker in over 150 years in January 2015? Goal salience theory will be used to explain this event.
In addition, since this protest took place during the public vote for speaker and not during a private
caucus, every vote in a leadership challenge can be examined for the first time. While the
conventional view of leadership elections is that policy differences can fuel campaigns, this article
argues that procedure is also important. Since it appears that the revolt was against the policies and
practices of the speaker, party unity is hypothesized to impact the vote. Analysis supports this and
other hypotheses, suggesting that goal salience theory is useful when modeling votes for speaker.
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Introduction
Shortly following the 2014 midterm elections, House Republicans caucused in private to
decide who would represent their party in the election for speaker in January. The incumbent
speaker, John Boehner, ran unopposed. However, this vote did not foreshadow an easy renomination for Boehner when Congress met to vote for speaker. Twenty-five of Boehner’s fellow
Republicans did not support him and scattered their votes among 13 different candidates.
The unusualness of this scenario cannot be understated. In their definitive study of elections
for the speakership, Jenkins and Stewart (2012) noted that, through 2010, a member of the majority
party had voted for someone who was not the nominee of the caucus only once since 1925. The
vote against Boehner was the largest challenge to an incumbent speaker from his own party since
1860. What can help explain this type of intraparty revolt against the speaker?
Such a public challenge to a sitting speaker from his or her own party has not been seen in
modern times. However, a framework does exist to study the individual factors that influence
leadership votes within a caucus: goal salience theory. Though never used to model the actual vote
for speaker, this article will examine whether or not goal salience theory gives context and clarity
to Boehner’s reelection.
Goal salience theory emphasizes that legislators vote for candidates in leadership elections
who can assist that legislator achieve her or his goals. These goals include reelection, the enactment
of public policy, and internal advancement. Which goals are the most salient, however, are
dependent upon the candidates and the substance of their campaigns. Given these conditions, it is
worthwhile to analyze Boehner’s relationship with his party to see what may have motivated this
protest against him.
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In this case, however, there was little formal opposition to Boehner, and those that did run
stressed that their campaigns were not against the sitting speaker but against authority itself. This
is unique, as past challenges have historically been spearheaded by a distinct challenger.
Republicans had increased their ranks over the previous three election cycles by tapping into a
conservative and anti-status quo sentiment in the electorate. This fervor subsequently spread
throughout much of the Republican caucus, which made life difficult for Boehner. Many of the
speaker’s largest pieces of legislation had consistently been challenged from within his own party
on both substantive and procedural grounds.
In keeping with the three prongs of goal salience theory (reelection, public policy, internal
advancement), it appears as if policy differences may be one of the primary motivators of the vote
against Boehner. However, contrary to the conventional view in the literature, there may be two
dimensions to 'the enactment of public policy' that is causing upheaval within the Republican
caucus. Traditionally in the literature on intraparty challenges, members who are upset with
policies wish that legislation was more ideological (Green 2008); therefore, it is hypothesized that
increased conservatism will be associated with a decreased likelihood of supporting Boehner.
However, Republicans may also object to how policy is being enacted. That is, these
members of the House may not like that Boehner has tried to introduce bills without their consent
or input. In other words, they object to the process of legislating. This implies that ideology alone
would not be enough to capture this effect; it is possible that a legislator may agree with the content
of a bill but disagree with its creation. Therefore, a measurement is needed to capture
dissatisfaction with legislation that is not identical to ideological disagreement. To measure this,
it is hypothesized that those with lower levels of party unity may be more likely to vote against
Boehner for the speakership.
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In order to analyze this vote, two new contributions are made to the literature on intraparty
challenges. First, since the campaign against Boehner appeared to be based on policy and
procedure, party unity will be used as an independent variable for the first time to model an
intraparty challenge. In addition, past studies of leadership votes have had to rely on incomplete
data sets. The votes were cast when parties would caucus in private, so scholars relied on archival
data or public declarations of voting intentions. In contrast, this challenge was made during the
actual vote for speaker. This allows for the entire population of votes in an intra-party challenge
for speaker to be analyzed for the first time.
A logit model of vote choice among Republicans finds support for the hypothesis regarding
party unity and for other hypotheses borrowed from the goal salience literature. These results
suggest that goal salience theory is a useful framework for evaluating votes for speaker. In
addition, the results of earlier studies on intraparty leadership elections receive further support as
those findings that were based on partial data sets are corroborated. Furthermore, these results
foreshadowed the unusual demise of Boehner’s speakership and suggest how Paul Ryan will
operate in this environment, both of which are discussed in the conclusion of this article.
This article will proceed as follows. First, the prior studies on votes for speaker and
intraparty contests will be reviewed, followed by a close look at the challenge to Boehner. The
hypotheses will be explored in more detail. The data will then be described and modeled, followed
by a brief conclusion.

Literature Review
Early studies on the vote for Speaker of the House focused on qualitative or anecdotal
aspects of those elections. Hinds (1909) noted that the vote for speaker was different from almost
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all other types of elections, because, “Most of those who elect a speaker know him personally...”
(159). Peabody (1976) also focused on the personal characteristics of leaders, while Nelson (1977)
was more concerned with party idiosyncrasies with regards to issues such as succession and
challenges. Yet even these early studies noted that specific missteps may lead to a challenge; as
was noted by Hinds (1909), a speaker may be replaced if he “betrays or mal-administers the trust”
that was given to him or her (162).
The most rigorous review of voting for speaker comes from Jenkins and Stewart (2012).
The authors studied every vote for speaker through 2010. In it, they lay out a theory they name
“organizational cartel theory” to understand the development of the vote for speaker. They argue
that the current system of election was introduced following the Civil War. Prior to this, numerous
votes for speaker were contentious, as members of the House were influenced by their competing
loyalties to both their party and to their region of the country. That is, differences between
Democrats and Republicans may be felt as strongly as differences between northerners and
southerners. However, a system quickly formalized once the Republicans were the only party in
Congress. The party would caucus prior to the vote for speaker to decide on a nominee. Once the
nominee had been decided, the vote for speaker then fell along party lines. The speaker would
attempt to quell dissent and punish protesters through the subsequent granting and removal of
committee assignments.
Though their work is impressive, the framework established by Jenkins and Stewart (2012)
does not allow for a full understanding of the machinations that were taking place within
Republicans during the vote for Boehner in 2015. Those authors found that contentious votes were
due to the differences between the parties, but this study is interested in the conflict within a party.
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Therefore, it is worthwhile to turn to the literature on intraparty challenges to understand how
Republicans voted for speaker.
The field of intraparty challenges laid rather dormant until it was revived by Green (2006)
and Harris (2006). Green (2006) sought to develop a theory to explain challenges to incumbent
speakers. First, Green (2006) emphasized that party leaders are perceived to assist legislators
accomplish at least one of the following goals: secure reelection, further their policy goals, or
increase their internal influence. Therefore, there should be a challenge to the leadership if a
member feels that the speaker is not helping them in one of these important ways. Green (2006)
then introduced a framework labeled goal salience theory. According to this theory, the candidates
seeking a leadership position and their respective campaigns will highlight some combination of
those three aforementioned variables. That is, whether or not reelection, policy goals, or internal
influence will impact a intraparty challenge is dependent upon the environment of the election.
For example, Green’s (2006) study focused on the challenge by Mo Udall to Speaker John
McCormack within the Democratic Party in 1969. Given the liberal bent of Udall’s challenge as
well as his pledge to assist younger members, it was hypothesized that ideology and age would be
among the most important variables. Using an assortment of archival data to test the results of this
secret ballot, support was found for these and additional hypotheses.
Goal salience theory has guided much of the subsequent work in this field. For example,
Green and Harris (2007) studied the 2006 House Republican majority leader’s race between John
Boehner, Roy Blunt, and John Shadegg. Boehner and Shadegg positioned themselves as outsiders
in their respective campaigns; unsurprisingly, the statistical analysis found that those who were
elected in 1994 as part of the 'Gingrich Revolution' were more likely to support those two than
Blunt. Green (2008) found that policy differences on abortion were a leading factor in Steny
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Hoyer’s win over John Murtha for the position of Democratic majority leader in 2006, as Murtha
was more pro-life than Hoyer and those with higher scores from the pro-choice group NARAL
were more likely to support Hoyer. Frisch and Kelly (2008) also found that camaraderie was
important in the Senate Republican whip race in 2006, as those who served with Trent Lott in the
House were more likely to support him over Lamar Alexander than those who did not.
These studies have tested goal salience theory in a variety of contexts in different eras, but
there has been one constant throughout: the presence of a sustained and substantive opposition.
These studies have only analyzed elections where there has been a serious contest for the position.
To date, there has not been a study of a contest where there is no true campaign against an
incumbent. Such a scenario would be a unique test of the theory that would serve to further
highlight the importance of campaign context.
Furthermore, all of these studies have relied on fragmented data. Leadership races have
historically been conducted via secret ballot during a party caucus. Therefore, there is no public
record of the vote. Data from past studies has relied on the personal tallies of candidates (Green,
2006) or media reports of public declarations of support (Green, 2008; Frisch and Kelly, 2008)
that have not included every individual vote. While there is little reason to suspect that legislators
are not truthful in their pledges or that there are systematic differences between those who
publicize their votes and those who do not, the lack of a complete data set of every single vote
across all of these studies suggests that a full record could serve to bolster their conclusions.
Fortunately, the election of the speaker in 2015 incorporates both of these aforementioned aspects.
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The 2015 Vote for Speaker of the House
Boehner was elected speaker when the Republicans gained the majority in the House in
2010. While that election was relatively uncontroversial, there was an unusual public challenge to
his post following the 2012 election when 11 Republicans voted against him. It appeared that that
number may double when it came time to vote in 2015.
Speaker Boehner had been consistently flummoxed by a sizeable portion of his caucus.
Starting in 2010, many Republicans came to Congress under the banner of the “Tea Party,” which
has been argued to have been fueled by conservative and anti-establishment ideals; this put them
at odds with their leadership. These members consistently decried both the procedure and
substance of many pieces of legislation that were introduced by Boehner. For example, a “grand
bargain” was negotiated behind closed doors by Boehner and President Obama in 2011 that would
have greatly altered taxes and entitlements. However, the deal would have called for an increase
in some taxes, which was anathema to many within the Republican caucus. There was worry that
such a proposal “might lead to outright insurrection and a breakaway third party” (Bai, 2012).
Boehner eventually walked away from the deal.
A similar situation occurred in 2012 when Boehner attempted to pass a bill to avert going
over the “fiscal cliff,” which was the nickname given to the simultaneous raising of taxes due to
the expiration of tax cuts and reduced government spending due to sequestration that was due to
take place in January 2013. First, a $2 trillion deal that would have increased taxes on millionaires
and reduced entitlement spending while also lifting the debt ceiling was negotiated between
Boehner and the White House. When word of the proposal leaked to his caucus, the subsequent
protestations from his party led to it being quickly scuttled. Boehner’s “Plan B” was to focus only
on taxes and then negotiate with the White House over spending. This bill sought to freeze income
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taxes at their current levels for most people while allowing the rates to rise for millionaires. After
ensuring the public that the bill would pass, Boehner had to pull it off of the floor shortly before
the vote because not enough Republicans supported it (Kane, O’Keefe, and Montgomery, 2012).
As 2014 came to a close, the anti-establishment wing of the House caucus was again a
thorn in Boehner’s side. That November, President Barack Obama had taken extensive executive
action regarding the deportation of undocumented immigrants. This outraged House Republicans
on both political and procedural grounds. They felt that the spending bill that passed in December
should have had provisions in it targeted at the enforcement of immigration laws, but Boehner
ignored their pleas and instead promised to deal with immigration in 2015 (Sherman and
Bresnahan 2015).
Partially because he knew that the vote for speaker could be challenging, Boehner tried to
make amends with many in his caucus. Aside from personally campaigning for them, Boehner
also distributed money in amounts of either $5000 or $10,000 to many House Republicans. In all,
Boehner’s Freedom Project PAC donated $1,225,000 to campaigns for the House (OpenSecrets;
French and Bresnahan, 2015).
After the November election, the Republicans held their caucus and voted on their nominee
for speaker. Boehner ran unopposed. Following this vote, however, many Republicans expressed
their displeasure with the party’s leadership and policies. Representative Dave Brat (R-VA), who
had upset the sitting majority leader in a primary in 2014, wrote that, “Washington is broken in
part because our party’s leadership has strayed from its own principles of free market, limited
government, constitutional conservatism.” (Brat, 2015). Brat also expressed displeasure at the lack
of time provided by the leadership to review legislation. In addition, Representative Walter Jones
(R-NC), when asked why he supported a challenge to Boehner, said, “I want us to have [a] leader
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who is willing to stand up for conservative, religious principles I believe in. It is to make a
statement and it’s based on many months of consideration” (Book, 2015).
Though many were publically displeased, there was little in the form of a formal campaign
by any candidate against Boehner. Furthermore, the campaigning that did take place emphasized
that the movement was not for anyone but was against the current leader’s style. Representative
Ted Yoho (R-FL) declared on January 4 that he would run if no one else chose to challenge
Boehner. Yoho, in a prepared statement, wrote, “The American People have spoken loud and clear
by their choice to elect conservative Representatives to serve them in Washington. It’s our turn
now, as Members of the People’s House, to echo their demands by electing a new Speaker.”
However, Yoho went on to write that this challenge was not meant as an affront to the current
speaker, stating, “Our vote for a new Speaker is not a personal vote against Representative Boehner
- it is a vote against the status quo. Our vote is a signal to the American people that we too, have
had enough of Washington politics, and that we will stand with the American people” (Boyle,
2015).
This sentiment was echoed by the second person to enter the race against Boehner,
Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX). In his statement, Gohmert stressed that, “...the Speaker’s
election is not about a particular candidate. It is about whether we keep the status quo or make the
change the country demands” (Gohmert, 2015). Following the election, Gohmert maintained this
theme in an interview on “Fox and Friends,” where he stated, “As I said from the beginning, it was
never about me, that’s why I urged Yoho to get in, that’s why I urged [Representative] Daniel
Webster to get in, and was urging a couple others that didn’t...” (McCalmont, 2015).
The third challenger, Representative Daniel Webster (R-FL), also had an unconventional
campaign. Webster, who had served as speaker in the Florida legislature, gained the attention of
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many conservatives following a November speech to the Republican Study Committee. Many of
his fellow legislators urged him to run; however, Webster did not announce his campaign until the
day before the vote. At the time that, he realized that he would be nominated for the position
whether he announced or not. His “campaign” was so muddled that many were still unsure if he
was actually running (French and Bresnahan, 2015). In keeping with the motivations of Yoho and
Gohmert, Webster said afterwards, “In the end this is not personal. I was in this to try to influence
the process. Done. John Boehner is a friend” (Leary, 2015).
Though the campaigns against him may have been unconventional, Boehner still faced the
largest challenge to a sitting speaker since the Buchanan Administration. Boehner needed a
majority of all of the ballots cast to keep the speakership. Out of 408 ballots cast, 216 were for
Boehner. While the Democratic caucus was largely united against him, a total of 25 Republicans
did not vote for him. Among the declared Republican challengers, Webster was the leading votegetter with 12 votes. Gohmert was in second place with three votes while Yoho garnered two. The
other votes were scattered among other Republican government officials (Sherman and Bresnahan,
2015).
Following his re-election, Boehner directly confronted the notion that he was too strongly
tied to the status quo of Washington while also acting quickly against those who had opposed him.
In a speech, he declared, “I’m the most anti-establishment speaker we’ve ever had.” Boehner cited
the elimination of earmarks and his belief that all members of the House should participate in
governing in support of this assertion (Sherman, 2015a). Additionally, two members of the House
who voted against Boehner were removed from the powerful Rules Committee just hours after the
formal vote. Boehner said that, “Because of some activities on the floor, two of our members
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weren’t put back on the committee immediately” (Pappas, 2015). Those members were
permanently replaced in April (Marcos, 2015).

Theory and Hypotheses
Goal-salience theory suggests that the records of the candidates and the context of the
campaign need to be considered when developing hypotheses. This campaign features a unique
test of the theory because there was little sustained challenge by those running and much deference
among the candidates towards each other and towards the incumbent speaker. Instead, those
running against Boehner agitated against “Washington as usual” politics and desired more
conservative legislation. Therefore, if there was a theme among the challengers, it was one of
policy and procedure. Many House Republicans not only disapproved of the substance of
Boehner’s bills, but they also disapproved of how he brought bills to the floor and therefore sought
relief by voting against him.
According to goal-salience theory, legislators have three primary goals. Those goals are
re-election, public policy, and internal advancement. Given the context and nature of the
campaigns against Boehner, all three prongs are relevant.
Re-election is always a concern among elected officials. Therefore, Boehner used his
ample campaign war chest to assist his caucus during the 2014 campaign season and to try to head
off a challenge to his speakership. Earlier studies have found a link between campaign
expenditures and leadership votes (Green and Harris, 2007); therefore, it is hypothesized that those
who receive money from Boehner’s PAC will be more likely to vote for him.
Internal advancement goals have traditionally been measured in two different ways to try
to capture the competing goals at stake. This is because of differences between those in leadership
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positions and those who are not: those that lack power wish to have it, while those who have it
wish to keep it. Past studies have included variables to capture “cohort” effects (Green, 2006;
Harris, 2006; Green and Harris, 2007). The logic behind such measurements is that members that
are elected together at certain times seem to share a kindred spirit. Given the changes in the
composition of the House, it is reasonable to assume that those who have been elected recently
share a similar anti-authority belief. Therefore, it is hypothesized that newer members will be less
likely to vote for Boehner.
On the other hand, other studies have modeled inclusion in party leadership as a factor in
leadership votes (Harris, 2006; Green, 2008). Those that are in power have historically supported
the status quo. Since this is a challenge fueled by protest, it is hypothesized that those that are the
heads of committees or in the party leadership will be more likely to support Boehner.
Past studies of leadership votes have tried to model public policy displeasure in two ways:
ideological extremity (Harris, 2006; Green, 2006; Green and Harris, 2007) or by positions on
specific policies (Green, 2008). Given that many legislators wanted bills that were more
conservative, ideology appears to be an appropriate variable to use in modeling. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that increased conservatism is associated with an increased probability of voting
against Boehner.
Aside from ideological considerations, many of the speaker’s largest pieces of legislation
had consistently been challenged from within his own party on based on procedural grounds. Many
House Republicans were opposed to the deal-making between Boehner and Obama and felt left
out of the legislative process. Therefore, while these members may have agreed with the substance
of the bill, they did not agree with the process. If this is so, then ideological extremity will not
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capture this particular effect. What is needed is variable that measures displeasure with legislation
but is not merely a substitute for ideology.
If those who voted against Boehner for speaker did so to voice their displeasure with how
he negotiated policies, it is likely that this same behavior manifested itself in other ways. One of
the most public ways of making such a protest would be by voting against legislation that was
proposed by Boehner. That is, House Republicans may have protested against “Washington as
usual” politics by their earlier votes against their own party. This dissention within House
Republicans implies that those with lower levels of party unity may be more likely to vote against
Boehner for the speakership. This variable hopefully captures dislike for how legislation is crafted.
By consistently refusing to “go along to get along,” it is hypothesized that those who voted against
the wishes of their party with greater frequency were also more likely to vote against Boehner.

Data
Previous tests of goal-salience theory relied on incomplete data sets. Leadership votes are
always conducted in secret, so the actual votes by legislators are never revealed. Therefore, past
studies used archival data from the personal papers of the candidates (Green, 2006; Harris, 2006)
or publicly declared votes (Green and Harris, 2007; Green, 2008; Frisch and Kelly, 2008). Though
many of the studies could not model every legislator’s vote, the authors often argued strenuously
and convincingly that their inferences were sound.
This study, on the other hand, analyzes intraparty conflict using the public vote for speaker.
This election was aired live on CSPAN and every vote was recorded. For the first time, analysis
using goal salience theory will include all of the votes with no question pertaining to their veracity.
Therefore, the dependent variable in this analysis will be whether or not a Republican voted for or
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against Boehner. There were 216 votes in support of Boehner from his own caucus, with 25 votes
against him.
The independent variables come from myriad sources and descriptive statistics may be
found in the appendix. Ideology, in the tradition of earlier studies in the literature (Green 2006),
will be measured using first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores from the prior Congress. This
measure takes the votes made by members of Congress and then places the members along an
ideological spectrum based on how often legislators vote with one another Larger scores are
associated with increased conservatism. This variable ranged from a low of 0.176 to a high of
0.636. Party unity scores come from OpenCongress, a product of the nonpartisan non-profit
Sunlight Foundation. It records how often an individual member voted with a majority of other
Republicans and includes every vote taken during the prior Congress. This variable ranged from
75.1 to 98.2. Information regarding those who received money from Boehner’s PAC (Freedom
Project) comes from OpenSecrets.org and is dummy coded. Of the 197 members of Congress that
are analyzed, data on leadership membership and years served in Congress comes from
Congressional Quarterly.

Analysis and Results
Since the dependent variable for this analysis is dichotomous, a logit model is used. Since
they did not have party unity scores nor measures of ideology, this model omits freshman. A
description of a separate analysis on freshman is discussed later in the article. Four additional
members were excluded: Clawson (FL), Graves (LA) and Brat (VA) because they joined the
previous Congress late and did not have ideology nor party unity scores; and Guinta (NH) who
was not a freshman but did not serve in the previous Congress.
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Given that the estimated proportional reduction in error (ePRE) of the model is upwards of
25%, it is suggested that this model improves upon the naive model. Diagnostic tests suggest no
evidence of multicollinearity. Most importantly, this model lends support for almost every
proposed hypothesis. Since interpreting a logistic regression table is not intuitive, this section will
detail the findings.
Table One: Logit Model for Vote against Boehner
Variables

Coef.

Std. Err.

Party Unity

-0.290

0.065

Ideology

6.465

2.316

Seniority

0.122

0.041

Freedom Project PAC

-1.215
-223.03

80.105

Constant
N

197

McFadden's R^2

0.306

ePCP

86.9

0.673

ePRE
27.93
Note: All variables significant at the 0.05-level (one-tail) are in bold

First, those in positions of power were unanimous in their support for Boehner, so that
variable was not included in the model. Everyone that served in the leadership or as the chair of a
committee voted for Boehner. This provides support for the hypothesis that those in the leadership
fought to preserve the status quo and did not protest.
Those Republicans who were more conservative than the rest of their party were also more
likely to vote for someone other than Boehner. For a standard deviation increase in conservatism,
the odds of supporting anyone but Boehner are 2.05 times as great, holding all other variables
constant. This gives support to the hypothesis that suggests that those who are more conservative
would be less likely to support Boehner.
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In addition, it is also apparent that Boehner’s PAC wielded an influence as well, as those
who received a donation from the speaker were more likely to support him. All else constant, with
a donation for Boehner’s PAC, the odds of supporting him for speaker are 0.30 times greater. This
supports the re-election hypothesis that those who received campaign money from Boehner would
be more likely to support him. Seniority also impacted the vote; those who had been in Congress
longer were more likely to vote for Boehner.
The results up to this point bolster the findings from past studies of intraparty leadership
votes. These variables had been in prior studies, but this is the first time that they had been
examined using a complete data set of every single vote. This support for earlier findings helps to
confirm the robustness of earlier work in addition to the applicability of this framework to analyze
a vote for speaker.
Most importantly for this study, there is strong support for the unique hypothesis regarding
party unity. Those who voted less often with their party were also less likely to vote for Boehner.
Specifically, for a standard deviation decrease in party unity, the odds of supporting Boehner
decrease by a factor of 0.39, holding all else constant. Party unity as measured by Poole and
Rosenthal was substituted for this measure and the results were substantively similar. This supports
the hypothesis that those who were upset by the procedures of the leadership during the previous
term continued to voice their displeasure when they voted for the speakership.
This result is also presented graphically in Figure One, which plots the predicted
probability of supporting Boehner given a member’s level of party unity. As can be seen, the effect
is quite dramatic. Among those who supported the party over 90% of the time, the predicted
probability of voting against Boehner is almost zero. However, that quickly changes; as party unity
drops to only 75%, the lowest score of any House Republican, the predicted probability of voting
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for Boehner is close to zero. This provides strong support that this variable captures a unique part
of the protest against Boehner’s tactics.

0
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.6

.8

1

Figure One: Party Unity on the Probability of Voting against Boehner
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Predicted Probability
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A model with all of these independent variables requires a representative to have served in
Congress; therefore, all of the freshman are dropped from analysis. Therefore, an additional
omitted model was tested that only included freshman. The most interesting information comes
from an analysis of Boehner’s PAC contributions. Of the 41 freshman, Boehner’s PAC contributed
to 37 of them. Unexpectedly, the four that did not receive money all supported Boehner. In a logit
model of vote choice, this variable predicts failure perfectly and must be dropped. Broadly
speaking, this suggests that these PAC donations may not have much influence on the leadership
votes of freshman members of Congress.
Other variables have been included in previous studies leadership votes, but since the
framework established by goal-salience theory did not suggest that they would have an impact,
they were not expected to have an effect. Those include: age (Green, 2006); region (Green and
Harris, 2007; Green, 2008); and margin of victory (Green, 2006). Jenkins and Stewart (2012) also
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suggest that region may matter. These variables were tested and found to not be significant, so
they have been omitted.
It may be argued that a more direct measure of the protestations of the Republican caucus,
such as membership within the Tea Party caucus is warranted. However, as noted by Gervais and
Morris (2014), it is difficult to identify members of the Tea Party in Congress because the Tea
Party Caucus is dormant. Gervais and Morris (2014) categorized Tea Party membership using
campaign contributions, endorsements, activism on Twitter, membership in the Tea Party Caucus,
Tea Party self-identification on social media, and news media references. The results suggested
four different categories of Tea Party membership. These four categories were included in a model,
as was membership in the Tea Party caucus, and none were significant
It may be argued that the partisanship of the representative’s districts should also be
modeled. It could be the case that the members of Congress were simply responding to the
preferences of their constituents. This was measured in three ways: as the percent of the district
that voted for the Democratic nominee in 2012, 2008, and the average of the two years. These
variables were never significant and were omitted.

Discussion
During the fiscal cliff negotiations, Boehner’s job was likened to “herding cats” (Parker
and Peters, 2013). That analogy could aptly describe his tenure as speaker. Though a significant
portion of House Republicans objected during the vote in 2015, Boehner held on to his position.
However, he was not in power for long. In September of 2015, Boehner announced that he would
soon be resigning from his position. There was a threat of a “no-confidence vote” that had the
support of numerous members of the Republican caucus. If the vote had been successful, Boehner
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may have had to rely on the votes of Democrats to retain his speakership, which would not have
been a sure bet.
What does this study tell us about Boehner’s departure from the speakership? Based on
these results, his departure was not unexpected. The “no-confidence vote” was first floated by
Representative Mark Meadows in July. Meadows resolution had little to do with Boehner the
person and much to do with Boehner the leader. Meadows noted that Boehner had “endeavored to
consolidate power and centralize decision-making, bypassing the majority of the 435 Members of
Congress and the people they represent” (Miller 2015). Therefore, this was a protest much in line
with the policy and politics strain of Boehner’s earlier vote for speaker.
Meadows was a member of a group that formed shortly into the 114th Congress named the
House Freedom Caucus. This group almost perfectly encapsulates those who would be the most
likely to oppose Boehner based on the results from this study. Fifteen of their members voted
against Boehner in the 2015 vote for speaker. Their members are more conservative and have less
seniority than the average Republican in the House (Bialik and Bycoffe 2015). However, their
protestations are not solely fueled by ideology. Rather, the crux of the groups appears to be
dissatisfaction with procedure. Representative Justin Amash, a founding member of the Freedom
Caucus, said with regards to Boehner that, “the problem isn’t that he isn’t conservative enough.
The problem is he doesn't follow the process” (Sherman 2015b). Amash stated that the group
simply wants the House to follow the rules of the institution. “In some cases, conservative
outcomes will succeed. In other cases, liberal outcomes will succeed. And that’s OK,” said Amash.
“The worst scenario is where you have one person or a small group of people dictate to everyone
else what the outcome is going to be in advance” (Sherman 2015b).
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Informed by this paper, the difficulties that were caused by the Freedom Caucus for
Boehner would hardly be unexpected. Based not only on their demographics, but on the clearly
stated purpose for the existence of the group based on dissatisfaction with process, it could have
been anticipated that the Freedom Caucus would not make life easy for Boehner. This suggests
that the ideas introduced and furthered in this study may be relevant in analyzing other similar
scenarios.
What does this work suggest for the speaker who succeeded Boehner, Representative Paul
Ryan? Prior to his election to speaker, Ryan appeared to seriously consider the demands of the
Freedom Caucus. Following a meeting with them, Ryan gained the support of a supermajority of
the caucus. It appears as if this may be due to Ryan agreeing with the premise of the group.
According to the leader of the group, Representative Jim Jordan, “We do have a commitment from
Paul to work on changing the rules...” (Scanlon 2015). If Ryan is able to successfully satiate the
institutional demands of the group, he may not have the same fate as his predecessor.

Conclusion
The leadership vote examined in this article was unique due to the public nature of the
agitation towards Boehner and the availability of data. Studies of past leadership votes have relied
on the goal-salience theory, but this vote included a component that was lacking in all earlier
studies: a public election. The history of Boehner’s speakership also suggested the inclusion of a
new variable: party unity. This variable was large and impactful, suggesting that future studies
should consider including a past history of individual dissention in their models. Furthermore, this
unique scenario provided a strong test of the goal-salience theory. Since it proved to be adaptable,
this study provides further verification of its usefulness. Most importantly, the results of this study
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do not greatly differ from those in past studies, which suggests that those studies should not be
ignored due to their incomplete data.
This study suggests that no leadership vote should be seen as perfunctory nor
unexplainable. If there is measurable dissention in the caucus during the previous Congress on
policy or procedural grounds, a challenge may be expected. Even if no actual challenger steps up
against the incumbent leader, there is now little reason to suspect that a protest vote will not take
place. In addition, if future caucuses prove to be unwieldy and break from the party often, there is
little reason to suspect that such challenges will not become more commonplace. What remains to
be seen is if and how the leadership chooses to respond to these intraparty insurrections. Will the
leadership propose more ideologically extreme bills? Will legislators have a greater say in policy?
Will there be greater turnover within the leadership? It will be interesting to see what strategies
are adopted and how effective they prove to be.
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Appendix
Table Two: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Vote
Party Unity
Ideology
Year
Freedom Project PAC

Obs
242
197
197
242
242
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Mean
0.103
93.516
0.439
2008
0.583

Std. Dev.
0.305
3.269
0.111
7.645
0.494

Min
0
75.1
0.171
1973
0

Max
1
98.2
0.67
2015
1
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